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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
This thesis will analyze on one of the ways in which
disputes arising from developed countries' investment
activities in the developing countries are decided. The
issues of investment and disputes are of great importance to
the developed countries as well as to developing countries.
The scope of the issues gives rise to a multitude of
questions of national and international law in an
interdependent world economy.
International investment attracts the close attention
of international law because it brings the movement of
people and financial resources from one country to another
and such movement gives rise to a potential risk for
conflict between the countries. Whereas disputes arising
from trade and financial transactions are mainly settled by
Aron Broches, Settlement of Disputes Arising out of
Investment in Developing Countries, in SELECTED ESSAYS World
Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law
458 (1995)
.
M. Sornarajah, The International Law on foreign Investment, 7-8
(1994) .
2means of domestic courts, the tools of international law are
often required in case of the foreign investment disputes.'
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID or the Centre) created by the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States has unique dispute settlement
mechanism. The jurisdiction of the Convention is limited to
disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other
Contracting States. Therefore, the increasing number of the
States that have ratified the Convention expand this
limitation of the ICSID' s jurisdiction and clearly
contribute to the growth of ICSID as an investment disputes
settlement institution.
The jurisdiction of the Convention is also limited by
the consent of the parties to submit a dispute to ICSID
conciliation and arbitration and the subject matter of a
dispute. The experience of ICSID in the settlement of
^ Id. at 8.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, I.E.L. VIII-A
(1989) . [hereinafter ICSID Convention] .
How many countries are members of ICSID? in Questions about
THE World Bank Group (visited July 15, 1997)
<http
:
//www. worldbank . org/html/extdr/faq/extqa025 . htm> . The
Convention has been signed by 13 9 States, of which 126 have
ratified the Convention.
3disputes involving the issues of the jurisdiction of the
Convention is particularly important part of this thesis.
CHAPTER II FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. Definitions: Nature and Structure.
It is clear that international investments have become
a very powerful source of economic development for many
countries. Private international investments activity has
had different stages in its history, from certain decades of
total rejection to other decades of being a very attractive
instrument in the international arena. Improvements on
communication and transportation have made the world more
interdependent, a place where the international investment
wields enormous power.
There are as many definitions of a foreign investment
as the authors who research on this topic. The definition
of the foreign investment may be broad or narrow depending
on the purpose in which it is used. Commonly the definition
of the foreign investment is given in the context of foreign
direct investment because it is the most common of the types
Seymour J. Rubin, Introduction, in International Investment
Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement 1 (1985) .
4
5of investments and because of its qualitative influence on
the economy of the recipient country. Foreign investment
may be defined as "the transfer of tangible or intangible
assets from one country to another for the purpose ... of
generating the wealth under the total or partial control of
the owner of the assets." One should distinguish the
content of the foreign direct investment from portfolio
investment. The principal feature of portfolio investment
is an absence of management and control of the enterprise.
The difference is necessary in defining the limits of
protection of these two kinds of foreign investment. An
investor usually carries his own responsibility in portfolio
investments, while the foreign direct investment has been
traditionally double protected. The host government
protects it by erecting protecting legislation and the home
state gives diplomatic protection to its national investor.
The distinction of the extent of protection afforded to the
two types of investment is drawn from the theory that a
portfolio investments may be pulled out in a dangerous
SORNARAJAH, supra note 2 , at 4
^ Id. at 4-5.
6situation, whereas the direct investment does not have such
flexibility of movements.
B. The Recent History of Foreign Investment.
The law of foreign investments, in these circumstances,
has become one of the most intriguing and controversial
areas of international law. As old the history of direct
international investments may be so are the number of
problems with respect to them still arise. These problems
re-surfaced in massive numbers at the end of the Second
World War with the division of the world into two totally
different economic and social systems. The end of
colonialism signaled a further growth in the number of
issues involving foreign investments. Being colonized for
a part of their history, these countries rejected any kind
of cooperation with Western countries. The newly
independent countries agitated not only for the ending of
economic colonialism but also for a new economic order that
could permit them to lead their own economies and to an
M.M. Boguslavskiy, Pravovoe Polojenie Inostrannyh
Investiziy [Legal Status of Foreign Investments]
,
Vneshneeconomicheskiy Centre "SOVINTERYUR" , Moscow, at 36
(1993) .
SoRNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 1.
access to the world market. The cold war between super-
powers, and non-aligned movement also made their
controversial impact to the development of international
investments. The collective actions of oil-producing
countries during the oil crisis of 1970s illustrated the
power and weakness of natural resources possession.
However, the trend was not one-sided. With
strengthening of an economy of developing countries, the
transnational companies had become tremendously powerful.
The transnational companies had already been not only
economic power but they could influence political and social
development of a country. As a result many developing
countries considered the transnational corporation as a
threat to their sovereignty. With the collapse of communism
in Eastern European countries and countries such as Soviet
Union as well as opening up of the remaining communist
countries namely China, Vietnam, to the world economy, the
competition for foreign investments highly increased. One
can define the above mentioned facts as macro-challenges of
foreign investment law.
'' Id.
^^ Id. at 1
^^ Id. at 2
8On the micro level, corporate investors have tried to
reduce their overall risk, or "variability of projected
outcomes" , while maintaining the total profits of their
investments. "According to the capital asset pricing
model, the total variability of any single investment is
composed of both systematic market risk and unsystematic or
diversif iable risk." The ability to control market risk
is insignificant. However, the investor can control
unsystematic risk. For those who invest in a foreign
country's economy, the unsystematic risks consist of
political and legal challenges. These challenges may vary
from creation of law hostile to foreign investments to the
extreme acts of the host governments such as an
expropriation or confiscation of a property. The
uncertainty in a foreign country may prevent investors from
investing in this country. It leads to losses for both the
investor and the host country. The investor may lose his
current or future profits and the host country loses
financial resources that are significant for the economy of
David A. Lopina, The international Centre for settlement
of investment disputes : investment arbitration for the
1990s, 4 Ohio St. J. of Disp. Resol . 107, 108 (1988)
.
See id.
'' Id.
'' Id.
9the developing country. If this scenario happens in more
global measures, the entire world economy might be
unfavorably influenced 18
^^ Id. at 107, 108
CHAPTER III THE NATURE OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
A. International Investment Disputes.
International investment disputes come along with
foreign investments. In the world of different stages of
social, economic, political and legal development, the rise
of large number of disputes are particularly apparent.
International investment disputes have been with us in one
or the other form since the movement of people and financial
assets has started, with the result that people, their
activity and assets have become subjected to the territorial
jurisdiction of the host country.
The debate on how to determine when a legal dispute
exists have never been settled. One of the most clearest
definitions was given by the Permanent Court of
Aron Broches, International Investment Disputes , in
SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and
Private International Law, supra note 1, 4 95 (1995) .
Gerhard Wegen, Dispute Settlement and Arbitration, in
International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement, supra
note 6, at 59, 62.
10
11
point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of
interests between two persons."
An international nature of the dispute does not
necessarily mean that it is a subject to public
international law. Indeed, governments of investor
countries have sought and protected investments abroad by
their nationals through boycott, embargo and even military
sanctions. In the context of this thesis, the term
"international" means a relationship between a state or a
state agency and a national of another country. The term
"investment dispute" consists of the disputes defined by
their subject matter and the area where they arise. "In
practice, however, this term is used more particularly to
refer to disputes between a state and a foreign investor
arising out of investments by the latter in the territories
of the former,"
Id. from Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ Series
A, No. 2, II.
^^ Id. at 62, 63.
'' Id.
24
Id. See also Aron Broches, Arbitration m Investment
Disputes , in International Commercial Arbitration 2 92 (Schmitthoff
ed. 1967); Aron Broches, Bilateral Investment Protection
Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes , in The Art
OF Arbitration 63 (Schultsz and van der Berg eds . 1982) .
12
In the most of the cases, investment dispute involves
the property of the investor which is located in the country
of investment. However, it must be noted that in the last
10 - 20 years an increased number of investment disputes has
not involved property. Nevertheless, management contracts,
concession agreements, licenses, give rise to very similar
2 5issues to those that involve real property. These issues
are in a way related to the sovereignty of the country.
"Investment as a subject becomes a field for battle over the
validity of general principles of international law or the
2 6Calvo doctrine," which denies the interference of the
investor state on his behalf in the affairs of the host
country. Countries are apparently very sensitive when the
delicate issue of possession of natural resources comes into
the discussion. The ownership of the natural resources by
the foreign person located in the host country is the most
typical example of the classical investment dispute.
25
Seymour J. Rubin, Overview , m International Investment Disputes
Avoidance and Settlement 2 (1985) .
'' Id.
'' Id.
28
Id. at 2, 3
13
Defining the nationality of the investor is often a
problem in an international investment dispute. It happens
when for example, transnational corporation incorporated in
the U.S. owns the shares in companies of Germany, France or
Switzerland and one of these European-based companies
invest in the developing country. The experience of ICSID
shows many examples of how difficult it is sometimes to
discover the nationality of the investor.
The concern of the investor over the applicability and
implementation of the host country laws may cause a dispute
to arise. Sometimes the future investor and the host
country establish stabilization clauses which restrict the
right of the host government to change its national laws. A
major source of investment disputes is the change of
national law of the host country which curtails the benefits
of the foreign investor previously enjoyed. When such a
dispute arises, neither foreign investor nor his home
government will normally accept the changes in host country
law or the actions of the host country's judicial
Broches, supra note 1, at 4 97
'° Id.
14
authorities.^^ The disputing parties may support their
arguments by using one of the following documents: the
United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty over
natural resources (1962) and economic rights and duties of
States (1974) , the 1967 OECD Draft Convention of the
Protection of Foreign Property, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, the draft United Nations Code of
Conduct of Transnational Corporations and the Helsinki Final
Act of 1975 and its follow - up.^^
B. Avoidance and Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of
Investment in Developing Countries.
There are several methods by which the investment
disputes might be settled. However, it would be desirable
for an investor and a host country before accepting the
decision on the investment activities, to set up and spell
out a mutual investment agreement in the way that prevents
disputes in a deal. The best way is to set up the ideal
transaction where there will not be any irritating
'' Id.
'' Id.
15
circumstances. As previously mentioned, there is a point
of sensitivity towards the host country with respect to
foreign ownership of the natural resources of that
country. Therefore, both parties should avoid an
infringement of the principle of "permanent sovereignty."
Generally the ownership benefits for the investor and
the investment benefits for the host country have a
dissuasive role with respect to disputes. However, where
the host country's policy over natural resources is hostile
to foreign ownership, the investor might choose to use
different methods of investment in order to avoid conflict
with the principle of "permanent sovereignty" over natural
resources. A concession agreement is nearly equivalent to
the possession of the natural resources. It is based on
contractual rights to exploit the natural resources of the
host country 37
Rubin, supra note 25, at 1, 5.
'' Id.
'
'' Id.
'' Id.
'' Id.
16
Another method of decreasing the negative impact of an
investment dispute is to include, in the agreement between
the parties, provisions recognizing that changes in
circumstances may occur, particularly during the long-term
investment agreement. Two kinds of situations may arise.
One is expressed in the Latin maxim: rebus sic stantibus
,
or approximately, changes in circumstances may change
agreements established under different conditions. The
second is pacta sunt servanda - agreements have to be
complied with. The reasonable agreement will anticipate
the possibility that disputes may arise no matter how
perfect the investment agreement is created. In this case
the renegotiation clause might help to avert certain
disputes
.
One of the other methods to lessen the occurrence of
investment dispute is to agree on general conduct of parties
to international investment, particularly the conduct of
transnational corporations. This can be accomplished by
'' Id. at 1, 6.
'' Id.
'' Id.
17
establishment of the multilateral code or adopting bilateral
investment treaties.
The issue of settlement of investment disputes arises
when avoidance has not been made appropriately or when it
could not prevent the dispute. Submission of the dispute
between the foreign investor and the host country to the
national court more likely will not be acceptable to either
side. The principle of national jurisdiction will refrain
the investor to submitting the dispute to the courts of the
host country, the same argument is relevant or even more
important for the host government.
Where the local jurisdiction is not acceptable, the
parties will look for another mean of settlement of their
dispute. Often it is an arbitration. If it is an
arbitration, the disputing parties should choose either the
institutional arbitration or ad hoc arbitration. When
selecting the arbitration institution each party will look
at the advantages that the arbitration institution can give.
The fact that ICSID is likely the most appropriate
institution of arbitration in investment disputes between
'' Id.
Broches, supra note 1, at 45 9.
18
foreign investors and host countries will be discussed in
the next chapters. A developed country probably would
choose the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or International
Chamber of Commerce as Western oriented arbitration
institutions, while a developing country would prefer the
regional arbitration centres of Asian African Legal
Consultative Committee such as Cairo Regional Centre for
Arbitration or Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for
Arbitration. There are many criteria why one or the other
arbitration Centre is preferred. They include "the nature
of the rules of the institutions, their procedures for the
selection of arbitrators and the likely place of
arbitration" as well as the question of cost.
If the parties cannot agree on institutional
arbitration, they will have to use one of the existing set
of arbitration rules such as the UNCITRAL Rules or to create
their own rules. This choice creates its own problems of
administration of arbitration.
Id. See also Aron Broches, Foreign Investment and the
Settlement of Disputes with Particular Reference to ICSID,
in SELECTED ESSAYS WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF Public
AND Private International Law, supra note 1, 257 (1995).
^^ Id. at 459-460.
^^ Id. at 460.
19
There are several cases of investment disputes such as
British Petroleum v. Libya, Aramco v. Saudi Arabia, where
the issues of delocalised procedure and the award without
nationality have arisen. Delocalized procedure means that
choice of law and the place of arbitration should be
different. The international character of the award permits
the award in the dispute be out of the scrutiny of national
arbitration laws. Developing countries have a tendency to
select the delocalized arbitration, to avoid submitting to
the jurisdiction of the foreign court. There are other
reasons, applicable to both investor and the host country
why parties prefer delocalized arbitration. They include
predictability and consistency of the arbitration rules
compared to the procedural rules of the other state in which
the arbitration will be said to be localized.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
^^ Id. at 461
CHAPTER IV THE UTILITY OF ICSID AS AN INSTRUMENT IN
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
A. Establishment of ICSID.
The idea of creating an international organization
which would regulate and promote the international
investments was under active consideration in the early
1960s. The cause of the emergence of this idea was the
contradiction between developed and developing countries in
settling the appearing investment (disputes. The lack of
trust in each other' s national judicial systems was the
main ground of controversy which was created by the epoch of
colonialism. When there is no belief in justice of the
local jurisdiction, the dispute requires the participation
of an independent third party.
The first efforts to establish an international body to
regulate foreign investment were accomplished by the
Lopina, supra note 14 , at 108-109. See also Malcolm D.
Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment
Climate of Developing Countries : the Cases of ICSID and
MIGA, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 103, 105 (1992).
20
21
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
*OECD").^^ The OECD's idea was to create a multilateral
convention on protection of foreign property and to develop
a multilateral investment insurance organization that would
protect investment from expropriation and other risks.
The OECD abandoned its unsuccessful efforts in 1967, mainly
because the developing world was not ready to accept in a
multilateral context the rules of law set by the OECD
Convention.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank) also started its efforts of
creation an organization with the objective of promoting
private foreign investments in the 1960s. First, the
draft of the Convention on establishment of the organization
promoting foreign investment was created. Then, the legal
experts from 86 countries meet each other to discuss the
Convention in 4 different cities of the world. The
Rowat, supra note 50, at 10 5.
" Id. at 103, 105-106.
Id. at 103, 106. 5ee also Aron Broches, The Experience of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, in International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and
Settlement, supra note 6 at 75, 76.
^^ Lopina, supra note 14 at 107, 108-109.
" Id. at 107, 109.
'' Id.
22
questions and concerns of these four meetings led to the
draft of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.
The Convention is commonly known as the ICSID Convention or
the Washington Convention. The Executive Directors of the
World Bank, on March 18, 1965, approved the draft of the
Convention for submission to the governments of countries
for the further process of signature and ratification.
The twentieth instrument of ratification was deposited on
September 14, 1966 and the Convention, as per Section 2 of
Article 68 accordingly entered into force on October 14,
591966.
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, which the 1965 Washington Convention created, is
an unique institution among the many institutions dealing
with arbitration and conciliation. The special nature of
ICSID comes from the fact that it is an international
58
^'^'
Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes : Some Observation on Jurisdiction, in
SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and
Private International Law, supra note 1, at 164.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 68. The Convention
was opened for signature on March 18, 1985, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1966) . The text of the Convention has also been
published in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
23
organization whose framework covers the particular area of
international investment disputes between the authorities of
the host country, which is a Contracting State to the ICSID
Convention, and the foreign private investor who is from a
State which is also a party to the Convention. In other
words, ICSID operates outside of the scope of domestic law
in issues necessarily involving a government entity on the
one hand and an entity under created national law (whether
it is a public law entity or private law entity) on the
other in their relationship with respect to an investment.
In the case of ICSID, most of member states consist of
developing countries. Quantitative dominance of developing
countries among member countries appears to be
understandable if one takes into consideration the economic
and political power of developed countries, their intention
to invest and gain profit in developing countries and from
the other hand, having those resources and the lack of
financial means and skills to utilize them by developing
countries. From an economic point of view, the governments
of developing countries usually have no alternatives but to
Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, ICSID Arbitration and Developing
Countries, ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal
Volume 8 Number 1 at 104 (1993) .
'' Id.
24
create as many incentives as they can offer to attract
foreign investment. ICSID as an international forum of
settlement of investment disputes, not subject to any
intervention of local courts, is considered to be one of the
incentives given by developing countries to foreign
investors to look more favorably towards investing in
developing countries. Obviously the purpose of
establishment of ICSID was not encouragement of foreign
investments in developed countries. In the sixties, the
developed countries already had reached economic and
political stability. What was aimed at by the drafters of
the ICSID Convention is some protection from "non-commercial
risks" associated with less economically developed countries
which were struggling to gain political control and to
utilize their economic resources to accelerate economic and
social development. In other words the purpose of ICSID was
to "depoliticize" the settlement of politically sensitive
4-4-62economic matters
.
See Broches, supra note 53, at 75, 77
25
B. Organizational Structure.
ICSID is essentially secretariat and governed by the
Administrative Council. Each Contracting State sends one
representative to the Administrative Council and each
representative casts one vote. All issues which are
before the Council are decided by majority vote. The
President of the World Bank is an ex-officio Chairman of the
Administrative Council but does not have a vote. The
principal functions of the Administrative Council consist of
the adoption of the administrative and financial
regulations, the rules of procedure for the institution of
proceedings, rules of conciliation and arbitration. The
Conciliation and Arbitration Rules govern the proceedings
6 8
unless the parties agree otherwise. The Administrative
Council by a majority of two-thirds of its members elects
Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, in SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects
OF Public and Private International Law, supra note 1, at 188, 189.
^'* ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 4(1) and Art. 7(2).
^^ Id. Art. 7(2) .
^' Id. Art. 5.
^^ Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 189. See also ICSID
Convention, supra note 4, Art. 6 (1) (a) , (b) and (c)
.
^^ Id. at 188, 189-190.
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the Secretary-General who is a principal officer of ICSID
and its registrar.
The Convention clearly states that the purpose of ICSID
is to be a Centre to administer conciliation and arbitration
of investment disputes and more generally guarantee the
practical implementation of the Convention. However, ICSID
does not directly conduct the settlement of the disputes.
The accomplishment of this task is left to the Arbitral
Tribunals and Conciliation Commissions which are set up
under the ICSID Convention. Their membership consists of
persons selected from among the list of Panels of
Conciliators and Arbitrators maintained by ICSID. Article
13 of the Convention provides: "Each Contracting State may
designate four persons to each panel who may but need not to
be its nationals. The Chairman may also designate ten
peirsons to each panel." Arbitrators and conciliators are
appointed in accordance with the Convention, by the parties
to the dispute which gives the parties great latitude in
constituting the Tribunal or Commission. However, ICSID
will not stop the process of establishment of the
Id. at 188, 190. See also ICSID Convention, supra note
4, Art. 10 (1)
.
Lopina, supra note 14, at 107, 109.
71 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 13.
27
Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal even if the
parties fail to reach a mutual agreement. With respect to
conciliation proceedings the only requirement is that the
Conciliation Commission should consist of a sole conciliator
7 3
or any uneven number of conciliators. If the parties
cannot agree on a number or method of appointment of
conciliators, the Convention states that the Commission
should be of three conciliators, one conciliator appointed
by each party and the third one appointed by agreement of
the parties. In case of arbitration there is an
additional requirement that arbitrators shall not be the
same nationality neither with the Contracting State which is
a party to a dispute nor with a national of the other
Contracting State who is also a party to a dispute. This
requirement looses its mandatory character when the
\
7 G
arbitrators are appointed by the parties to a dispute.
If the parties have failed to constitute the Commission
or Tribunal within ninety days after notice of registration
of the request for conciliation or arbitration by the
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 190.
^^ Id. See also ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 29(2).
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 29(3)
.
Id. Art. 38. See also Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 190
^^ Id. Art. 39.
28
Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Administrative
Council appoints the missing candidates for the Commission
or Tribunal. The parties to a dispute may appoint
conciliators or arbitrators from outside the Panels but the
Chairman is restricted to appoint arbitrators or
7 8
conciliators only from the Panels.
Once an award is rendered, it is binding on the parties
and must be recognized by the Contracting States as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State. However,
the parties by applying in writing to the Secretary-General
may request interpretation, revision, or annulment.
These procedures are designed to ensure self-contained
83
operation of ICSID and its autonomy.
Since the effective date of the Convention, only 41
disputes, of which 10 disputes are currently pending, were
brought before ICSID, a number that barely outnumbers the
years of ICSID' s existence. The main reasons for the low
^^
Id. Art. 3 and 38.
^^
Id. Art. 31(1) and 40(1).
''^
Id. at Art. 54 (1) .
^°
Id. at Art. 50 (1) .
^^
Id. at Art. 51 (1) .
^^
Id. at Art. 52 (1) .
Lopina, supra note 14, at 107, 110-111.
84 The International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 1 (visited July 15, 1997)
<http
:
//www. worldbank . org/html /extdr/ics id . html>
.
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number of cases before ICSID are its relatively recent
establishment, a lack of publicity and amicable settlement
by the parties to the dispute/^ The 1980s and the 1990s
have witnessed a high increase in the case load of ICSID.
8 6Thirty cases were submitted after 1981. The first
explanation of this increase is a growing number of State
Parties to the Convention, which was 126 in the middle of
1997, plus 13 more signatory States. The second
explanation is that the growing number of cases has created
a guide for new cases
.
However, the reasons commonly attributed to the fact
that there are still a limited number of cases before ICSID
is the existence of the annulment procedure set forth in
Article 52 of the Convention and the annulment proceedings
that have occurred under it.
'' Id.
'' Id.
87 See supra note 5
.
Kenneth S. Jacob, Reinvigorating ICSID with a New Mission
and With Renewed Respect for Party Autonomy, 33 Va . J. Int'l
L. 123, 125 (1992) .
30
C. ICSID Procedure for the Annulment of Arbitration Awards.
One of the most positive features of arbitration is
that it provides a final binding decision within a
reasonable period of time. Recently some decisions of ICSID
involving the annulment procedure have caused great concern
regarding ICSID' s future. This tendency in ICSID
jeopardizes the finality of the award of an arbitral
tribunal and may cause legal counsels to the parties to
hesitate to advise their clients to include arbitration
under the provisions of ICSID in their contracts. Given
that too often the cycle of award and annulment has
occurred, may well sap the vitality of ICSID.
The Convention established ICSID as in the words of
Georges Delaume "self -contained machinery functioning in
total independence from domestic laws, including the law
prevailing at the seat of arbitration." The role of
municipal courts in award enforcement is very limited. Each
Contracting State has agreed to enforce the award of ICSID
®^ Id. at 123, 146
'' Id.
Georges R. Delaume, The Convention for Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, in 2 Transn'l Cont. , booklet 17 at 37 (1990).
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"as if it were a final judgment of a in that State," subject
only to the local law of sovereign immunity from
execution. In order to have some control over the self-
contained machinery of ICSID, the drafters included the
provisions on annulment based on several narrow grounds
Article 52(1) consist of five grounds applicable to the
annulment process
:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers
;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons
on which it is based.
The language of Article 52(1) also causes confusion
regarding annulment and appeal in the ICSID proceedings
The last ground appears to be the most difficult for the ad
hoc Committee to avoid the interpretation of the award as an
appeal instead of reviewing it as an annulment . This
95
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Arts. 54, 55.
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 147.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 52.
David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID
Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between
Annulment and Appeal, ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law
Journal Volume 7 Number 1 at 37 (1992).
'' Id. p. 38.
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confusion caused by the vague definition of the word
"failed." The consequence of the inquiry whether there was
a failure to state the reasons on which the award is based
is that the inquiry might easily be transferred into an
examination of the substantive correctness of the award,
thereby passing the limits of annulment inquiry and
extending its authorities to the areas of inquiry reserved
solely to appeal proceedings. Nevertheless, annulment
remedy is not an appeal. Therefore, under the Convention
neither a mistake in the application of the law nor a
mistake of fact can be a ground to review an award.
The annulment remedy has intended to be applied only in
r 99
extraordinary and narrow categories cases. The
terminology of the Article, such as "manifestly exceeded"
and "serious departure" suggests that drafters of the
Convention intended to use the annulment procedure in
unusual circumstances. For example, in the words of
Kenneth Jacob a departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure must breach a principle of "natural justice, e.g.
that both parties must be heard and that there must be an
98
^^'
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 147.
'' Id.
Rowat, supra note 50, at 103, 114.
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adequate opportunity for rebuttal"^ ^ in order to support an
annulment. The Convention drafters also emphasized that the
requirement for a reasoned award did not mean that an award
can be annulled because the arbitrators had failed to give
an answer on every issue raised by the parties. The
history of annulment proceedings clearly indicates that
annulment should only be used in situations where there was
a major procedural fault on the part of an arbitral
tribunal
.
Kenneth Jacob states that another problem related to
the annulment proceeding in ICSID is the denial of the
rights of the parties to choose the arbitrators who will
deal with requests for annulment. If award is requested
to be annulled by the parties, the Chairman of the
Administrative Council has the power to appoint an ad hoc
Committee from the Panel of Arbitrators, e.g. the annulment
procedure jeopardizes the party autonomy feature of
international arbitration."^
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 148.
'°' Id.
^" Id.
^°^ Id. at 123, 125-126.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 52 (3)
.
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No annulment proceeding has occurred until 1983, when a
request was made to annul the award in Klockner v. Republic
of Cameroon
.
To date, three more annulment proceedings
have been requested, a considerable number given that there
has been annually only one ICSID award. In Klockner v.
Republic of Cameroon and Amco Asia v. Republic of Indonesia
awards were subsequently rendered in resubmitted
10 8proceedings. The applications by Klockner and Cameroon
for annulment of the second award were rejected. In two
other annulment proceedings, the parties have reached an
amicable settlement of their disputes.
Despite concerns from the international arbitration
bar, it appears that ICSID has taken action to circumscribe
and redirect the use of annulment procedures. For example,
the Secretary-General has successfully provided his good
offices to facilitate amicable settlement and cautioned
parties to use the procedure only within the parameters
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 149.
^°^ Caron, supra note 95, at 21, 28-29.
''' Id.
Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards,
in SELECTED ESSAYS WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF Public
AND Private International Law, supra note 1, at 3 09.
Caron, supra note 95, at 21, 28-29.
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envisioned by the drafters of the Convention. Moreover,
all the annulment decisions have been based on two of the
five grounds: the manifest excess of powers and the failure
to state the reasons on which award is based. If parties
could waive their rights to annul an award based on those
grounds in an agreement, the finality and legitimacy of
ICSID arbitration mechanism would be preserved.
"^"^^ International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes , IN International Arbitration Fora, Legal Aspects of
International Trade and Investment USDOS Office of the
General Counsel, GC Legal INTLARB Section III(F) (5)
(12/20/96)
.
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 152.
''' Id.
CHAPTER V THE JURISDICTION OF ICSID
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, as it was mentioned in the third Chapter of the
thesis, does not itself arbitrate or conciliate investment
disputes. It does not have jurisdictional powers in the
generally accepted meaning of this term. The drafters
nevertheless decided to use the word "jurisdiction" to
indicate the scope of the Convention. The use of this term
shows the extent of ICSID activities, as the administrative
organ of the Convention implementation.
The mere fact that a party ratifies the Convention does
not constitute consent to arbitration of a dispute.
114
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 199,
''' Id.
ICSID Convention, supra note 6, Preamble. The Convention
Preamble emphasizes the importance of the mutual consent of
the parties:
Recognizing that mutual consent by the parties to submit
such disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through
such facilities constitutes a binding agreement which
requires in particular that due consideration be given to
any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral
award be complied with;
and
Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact
of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this
36
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According to principal Article 25(1) the parties to an
investment dispute should fulfill three basic conditions
that constitute the necessary requirements for parties to be
eligible to use ICSID's facilities of arbitration and
conciliation:
The Jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any-
legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and
a national of another Contracting State, which the
parties to the dispute consent in writing to
submit to the Centre. When the parties have given
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally. (emphasis added)
.
The fundamental condition is consent. Consent is the
118
"cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre." The
jurisdiction of ICSID is further limited by the
prerequisites of the character of the parties and by the
119
nature of the dispute.
Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under
any obligation to submit any particular dispute to
conciliation or arbitration.
^^^ Id. Art. 25 (1) .
118 Report of the Executive Directors of the IBRD on the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, para. 23, 4 I.L.M. 524
(1965) [hereinafter Report]
.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(1).
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This Chapter discusses the essential significance of
the parties' consent to submit a dispute to the Center. The
consensual character of the Convention will then serve as a
guide to interpret the two other conditions, first subject
matter jurisdiction and, second, the identities of the
parties
.
A. Consent
.
1. Binding Character.
Article 25(1), in its formulation of the definition of
consent, stipulates that the consent must be in written form
and must be given by both parties to the dispute. The
decision of a State to consent to ICSID arbitration or
conciliation is a matter of pure policy of the parties.
Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification or
any time later, notify ICSID of the class or the classes of
disputes which it would not consider submitting to ICSID.
Article 25(1) states: "The jurisdiction of the Centre
shall extend to any legal dispute ... which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre."
Delaume, supra note 91, at 5.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(4) .
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However, when both parties have given their consent to
submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration or conciliation, no
party can withdraw its consent unilaterally. Refusal or
abstention of one of the parties cannot prevent ICSID from
the initiation, conduct or conclusion of the proceedings,
and the recognition and enforcement of the award. The
guiding principle of the ICSID rulings is that once ICSID is
satisfied that it has jurisdiction over an investment
dispute, it will process the dispute until its completion.
This is the case even if the Contracting State party to a
dispute attempts ex post facto to exclude from the
jurisdiction of ICSID classes of investment disputes or
denounces the Convention and ceases to be a Contracting
04- i- 126State
.
The strength of this principle was tested in Alcoa
Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica. The
^" Id. Art. 25(1)
.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 8.
William Rand et al
.
, ICSID' s Emerging Jurisprudence: the
Scope of ICSID' s Jurisdiction, 19 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
33, 53 (1986)
Delaume, supra note 91, at 8.
Discussed in John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the
Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) : Implications of the Decision on
Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v.
Government of Jamaica, 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 90 (1976). The
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dispute arose out of a long term agreement between Alcoa
Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. (Alcoa), an American corporation
and the Government of Jamaica (Jamaica) . In 1968, Alcoa
undertook to construct an aluminum refining plant in Jamaica
in return of tax concessions and long-term leases for the
mining of bauxite. . The agreement contained an ICSID
arbitration clause. In 1974, Jamaica imposed a new tax on
bauxite mining. Considering a new tax a violation of the
1968 investment agreement, Alcoa initiated ICSID
arbitration. Jamaica refused to appear at the arbitration
proceeding, relying on a reservation to ICSID' s jurisdiction
under Article 25 that Jamaica notified ICSID that "[IJegal
dispute arising directly out of an investment relating to
minerals or other natural resources" "...at any time..." could
not be submitted to ICSID arbitration. This notification
footnote 8 of John T. Schmidt article states that Alcoa v.
Jamaica case is:
Unpublished Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of
Arbitral Tribunal, International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) ARB 74/2 (1975) [hereinafter
Decision] . Under art. 48(5) of the Convention and reg.
21(1) of the ICSID Administrative and Financial
Regulations, ICSID cannot publish the text of an arbitral
award unless both parties to the arbitration agree
thereto
.
^'' Id. at 91.
^^^ Id. at 95 and 102.
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was made shortly before enactment of the law increasing the
tax on bauxite mining.
The Tribunal applied Article 45 of the Convention
empowering the Tribunal to render an enforceable award on
the merits of an investment dispute. The tribunal
enforced the prohibition on unilateral withdrawal of consent
by Jamaica and held Jamaica to the original investment
agreement, ruling that:
In the present case the written consent was
contained in the arbitration clause between the
Government and Alcoa.... [T] his consent having been
given could not be withdrawn. The notification
under Article 25 only operates for the future by
way of information to the Centre and potential
future investors in undertakings concerning
minerals and other natural resources of Jamaica.
Id. at 95. See also ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art.
45. It provides:
(1) Failure of a party to appear or to present his case
shall not be deemed an admission of the other party's
assertion.
(2) If a party fails to appear or to present his case at
any stage of the proceedings the other party may request
the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it
and to render an award. Before rendering an award, the
Tribunal shall notify, and grant a period of grace to, the
party failing to appear or to present its case, unless it
is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so.
Rand, supra note 125, at 33, 53. See also Schmidt, supra
note 127, at 90, 103.
42
2. The Forms of Consent.
The Convention does not specify the manner in which the
consent should be given. In most of the cases consent is
expressed in the conciliation/arbitration clause of an
13 2investment agreement. Comments on the forms of party
consent was given in the Report
:
Consent might be given, for example, in a clause
included in an investment agreement, providing for
the submission to the Centre of future disputes
arising out of that agreement, or in a compromis
regarding a dispute which has already arisen. Nor
does the Convention require that the consent of
both parties be expressed in a single instrument.
Thus, a host State might in its investment
promotion legislation offer to submit disputes
arising out of certain classes of investments to
the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor
might give his consent by accepting the offer in
... 133
writing.
The Arbitral Tribunal in its decision in Amco-Asia et
al . V. the Republic of Indonesia dealt with an issue of
the form in which consent should be given. The Republic of
Indonesia objected to ICSID's jurisdiction and requested the
132
Delaume, supra note 91, at 6.
Report, supra note 118, para. 24.
International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Arbitral Tribunal: Award on Jurisdiction in the
Matter of the Arbitration between Amco Asia Corporation et
al
.
and Indonesia September 25, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 351, 359
(1984) [hereinafter Amco]
.
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Tribunal to determine whether article 9 of the investment
application constituted a valid and effective consent to
treat P.T. Amco, as a United States national for the
purposes of the Convention. The Tribunal dealt with
Indonesia's argument that article 9 did not contain the
words of express agreement required by the article 25 of the
Convention. The Tribunal concluded that, "a convention to
arbitrate is not to be construed restrictively, nor, as a
matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It is to be construed
in a way ... to find out and to respect the common will of the
parties" with "application of the principle pacta sunt
servanda." Article 2 5 does not have any formal requisite
of an express clause, the Tribunal declaredargued. , and at
the date on which the parties consented to submit possible
future disputes to arbitration, the Republic of Indonesia
had knowledge that P.T. Amco was under the foreign control.
Consequently, the Tribunal held that Indonesia had consented
to ICSID arbitration and the Tribunal had jurisdiction over
the dispute.
''' Id.
^'' Id.
^^^ Id. at 360.
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The United States Government, in order to avoid
ambiguity in the notion of consent, included an express
clause in its 1994 U.S. prototype bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) which satisfies the United States' principal
objectives in bilateral investment treaty negotiations.
The BIT between the U.S. and Uzbekistan, for instance,
specifies that:
Each party hereby consents to the submission of
any investment dispute for settlement by binding
arbitration.... [T] his consent and the submission of
the dispute by a national or company under
paragraph 3(a) shall satisfy the requirement of:
(a) Chapter II of the ICSID Convention
(Jurisdiction of the Centre)..."
In an increasing number of instances, bilateral
treaties regarding the promotion and the protection of
investments represent one of the forms of investment laws
that make reference to ICSID facilities for the settlement
of investment disputes between the Contracting State and the
national of another Contracting State.
^^^ Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, 1994 WL 896767
(Treaty) at 2.
Treaty between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, in Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, supra note
22, Art. IX (4) [hereinafter Treaty].
Delaume, supra note 91, at 12.
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Such reference may take the form of exclusive choice by
an investor, among the options of dispute-resolution
institutions, including a primary recourse to ICSID
facilities. This treaty presents an original feature of
willingness of the host country to accept the choice of an
investor as to whether an investment dispute will be
submitted to ICSID arbitration.
Some bilateral treaties include provisions that upon
the request of the investor, an investment agreement between
an investor who is a national of one of the Contracting
States and another Contracting State will include provisions
referring to arbitration and conciliation under ICSID.
Such provisions give assurance to an investor that arising
investment disputes can be submitted to ICSID.
In order to improve the investment climate and
accordingly to attract private foreign investments, some
countries include ICSID arbitration/conciliation procedures
in their investment laws as a possible means of dispute
settlement with foreign investor. In connection to the
consent in national investment laws, the Report provided
^''^ Treaty, supra note 139, Art. IX(3).
Treaty between France and Malaysia, April 24, 1975 Art.
5, Investment Treaties , Year 1975, p. 9.
^^^ Id. at 10.
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that the host state might unilaterally offer to submit
certain types of investment disputes to the
arbitration/conciliation of ICSID, and the investor might
give his consent by accepting the offer in writing either in
an investment agreement or in a statement that he agrees to
submit particular disputes to ICSID. The issue of when
the moment of acceptance has occurred, continues to give
rise to controversy. According to Georges Delaume, the
investor might accept the host state's offer "...at the time
of the investment or at any time thereafter, including at
the time that the investor would file a request for
conciliation/arbitration with the ICSID Secretariat.""^
Another view is represented by Aron Broches . He
emphasizes the differences in the language of the host state
offer as expressed in its investment law. In some cases,
the language of investment law might require that acceptance
is to be given by the investor before the approval of the
investment. This situation obliges the investor to accept
the offer of the host state in order to acquire an approval
of the host country for fulfillment of investment project
Report, supra note 118, para. 24.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 10.
Broches, supra note 58, at 164, 169.
''' Id.
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and also to be eligible for the ICSID dispute settlement
mechanism.
In other cases, the language of the investment law does
not specify an acceptance time at all. This might raise the
question of whether the requirements of Article 25(1) are
satisfied in the absence of the written consent of the
investor. However, in this situation the investor may
rely on two other forms to express consent. First, reliance
on provisions of a bilateral treaty between the investor's
country and the host country. Second, the investor may
include an ICSID arbitration clause in the investment
agreement. The latter approach seems to be the most
reliable choice to express consent to ICSID. Regardless of
the form in which the consent might be given, it would be
beneficial from the point of view of the Host State as well
as of that of the investor to avoid ambiguity and to spell
out clearly the provisions of their mutual consent.
''' Id.
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
In order to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of
ICSID, the dispute should be of legal origin and arise from
an investment. The drafters of the Convention did not
provide a definition of either legal dispute or of
investment. This subchapter will discuss the rationale
behind the decision of the Convention drafters, and will
also analyze the range of the expression "legal dispute" and
the term "investment"
.
1. Legal Dispute.
According to the Report of the Executive Directors of
EBRD on the Convention, the purpose of the expression "legal
dispute" was to limit the scope of ICSID to disputes
involving the existence or scope of a legal right or duty.
The Report states that the expression "legal dispute"
clarifies that the disputes of "...conflicts of rights..." are
within the jurisdictional limits of ICSID while "...mere
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(1)
Rand, supra note 12 5, at 33, 35.
Report, supra note 118, para. 26.
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conflicts of interests are not." The Report adds that
"[t]he dispute must concern the existence or scope of a
legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation."
The legal dispute limits the scope of ICSID to disputes that
concern the corresponding rights and obligations of the
parties, as those presented in an investment agreement and
the relevant laws regulating an investment agreement. It
includes allegations of non-performance, violation of
"stabilization clauses" and nationalization and
expropriation. For example, in Amco-Asia et al . v. the
Republic of Indonesia, the legal dispute consisted of claims
of Amco-Asia such as unlawful expropriation, ouster by
Indonesian army and police, of their right to operate and
manage the hotel for thirty years, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment.
^" Id.
^" Id.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 29.
Christopher M. Koa, The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and Dispute Resolution:
Conciliating and Arbitrating with China through the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
,
24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 439, 451 (1991).
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes In the Matter of the Arbitration between Amco Asia
Corp. and Others and the Republic of Indonesia Award on the
Merits, 24 I.L.M. 1022, 1024 (1985).
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2. The Notion of Investment.
Neither the history of the Convention, nor Article
25(1) provides a precise definition of the term
"investment", even if the term has a significant importance
for implementation of the Convention.
The reasons for the lack of a precise definition of
investment in the Convention is based on three practical
considerations. A detailed definition of the term
"investment" as it is given in investment codes or BITs
would be too broad to be useful. On the other hand a
precise and short definition would have been difficult, if
not impossible, considering the different definition of the
term "investment" given by one country or group of
countries. It could also restrict the jurisdiction of
ICSID by giving a strict definition of the investment which
would limit the access of disputes to the jurisdiction of
Delaume, supra note 91, at 30.
''' Id.
159 Treaty, supra note 13 9, Art. 1(d) gives a comprehensive
definition of the forms of economic activity covered by the
term "investment"
.
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 208. See also Delaume,
supra note 91, at 30.
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ICSID even if the parties would consider a dispute as a
genuine "investment" dispute. Finally, in view of the
requirement that the mutual consent of the parties should be
given to submit a dispute to ICSID proceedings, the drafters
decided that the best solution was to leave the
characterization of the nature of their relationship and of
16 2
relating disputes to the parties.
The lack of a definition of investment was beneficial
for the implementation of the Convention in view of the
changes that have happened in international investment
activities since the time of establishment of ICSID. The
Convention was drafted at a time when most investments took
the form of concessions, loans or joint ventures, while
nowadays investments are taking new forms, such as; service
and management contracts, and agreements for the transfer of
know-how and of technology. By granting parties the
Delaume, supra note 91, at 30.
Id. See also Report, supra note 118, para. 27:
No attempt was made to define the term "investment" given
the essential requirement of consent by the parties, and
the mechanism through which Contracting States can make
known in Advance, if they so desire, the classes of
disputes which they would or would not consider submitting
to the Centre (Article 25 (4)).
Treaty, supra note 13 9, Art. 1(d) includes investment in
the form of contractual rights, such as under turnkey,
construction of management contracts; intellectual property,
including copyrights, patents, trade secrets, including
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freedom to characterize the term "investment", the
Convention has become more flexible to encompass new forms
of investment activity.
The concepts of "legal dispute" and "investment" were
designed to be rarely challenged and easily satisfy the
subject matter requirements. So far, the disputes that have
been raised before the ICSID tribunal concerning an issue of
the ICSID jurisdiction have been limited to those based on
claims of lack of consent and/or the failure to meet the
nationality requirement.
However, the ICSID Tribunal sua sponte raised the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Alcoa v. Jamaica.
The Tribunal first concluded that the dispute between Alcoa
and Jamaica is legal because it concerned the extent of the
parties' legal rights and obligations under their 1968
investment agreement. The Tribunal also relied on
arbitral precedents involving claims that by passage of
legislation a state violated contractual obligations owed to
an alien, necessarily stand for the proposition that such
know-how and confidential business information; as well as
established forms of investment.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 35.
^^^ Schmidt, supra note 127, at 90, 95-96.
^^^ Id. at 90, 98-99.
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16 7
cases are justiciable legal disputes. Next, the Tribunal
discussed the question whether the dispute involved an
investment issue. The Tribunal found that the economic
activities of Alcoa in Jamaica were in the ordinary meaning
of the term "investment" . It stated that a case "... in which
a mining company invested substantial amounts in a foreign
state in reliance upon an agreement with that State, is
16 8
among those contemplated by the Convention." It further
noted that the parties consent to ICSID arbitration itself
indicated that the economic relationship of the host State
16 9
and an investor was investment related.
The changes in investment codes, bilateral investment
treaties and the precedents of ICSID arbitration permit the
conclusion that generally in the context of contemporary
thinking, an economic concept of investment is progressively
substituting itself for the traditional notion of investment
of capital. Today the notion of investment is directly
related to the expected contribution to the economy of the
State concerned by the association of the resources of an
^^^ Id. at 90, 99.
''' Id.
^^^ Id. at 90, 100.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 31
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investor and the host State. It gives a new meaning to
the Convention and widen its jurisdiction.
C. The Identity of the Parties.
The machinery of the ICSID Convention was created with
the purpose of establishing a specialized international
forum particularly well suited to take into consideration
the respective rights of investors as nationals of a
Contracting State and other Contracting States. The
limitation of the scope of the Convention to disputes
between nationals of a Contracting State on the one hand and
the Contracting State on the other hand excludes from the
scope of the Convention disputes between international
persons, i.e. both states and international organizations,
for which there exists traditional methods of settlement
under international law. Disputes between private law
persons can be solved through recourse to the national
courts or commercial arbitration. Subject to the
limitation of juridical persons such as corporations, the
''' Id.
''' Id.
'^' Id. at 14.
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 201.
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scope of the Convention also excludes disputes between a
Contracting State and its own nationals.
1. The Identity of the Investor.
Article 25(1) of the Convention requires that one of
the parties be "a national of another Contracting State.
The Convention clearly states that national of another
Contracting State can be juridical or natural person which
has "the nationality of a Contracting State other than the
State party to the dispute."
In regard to natural persons, Article 25(2) (a) provides
that the nationality requirement must be met both at the
time when the parties consented to submit a dispute to
conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which
the request for conciliation or arbitration was
registered. "" Further, Article 25(2) (a) excludes from the
definition of "national of another Contracting State" the
situation when a person, on either of the relevant dates, is
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(1)
.
^^^ Id. Art. 25 (2) .
^" Id. Art. 25(2) (a)
.
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a national of both Contracting States party to the
dispute
.
With respect to juridical persons, Article 25(2) (b)
defines the "national of another Contracting State" as:
"any juridical person who had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to
the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation
or arbitration..."
Generally the nationality test of juridical persons is
based on the notion of the place of incorporation or ^^siege
social." Authority for the nationality test can be found
in the award in the arbitration between Amco-Asia v.
Republic of Indonesia, in which the Tribunal decided the
issue of Amco-Asia' s nationality on the grounds of the place
of incorporation.
Although a test of nationality based on the place of
incorporation is a principle, the principle is qualified by
the final clause of Article 25(2) (a) . According to this
provision, the juridical person incorporated in the host
''' Id.
^""^ Id. Art. 25 (2) (b) .
Delaume, supra note 91, at 15.
181 Amco, supra note 134, at 351, 361
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Contracting State might be considered as the national of
another Contracting State if:
... because of foreign control, the parties have
agreed [juridical person] should be treated as a
national of another Contracting State for the
18 2purposes of the Convention.
Article 25(2) (b) was designed to allow the
implementation of jurisdiction over all necessary parties to
a dispute in situations where foreign investments had been
transferred through a locally- incorporated entity. It is
quite usual for the host State, especially in case of a
developing country, to require that the foreign entity
operate its business within the territory of the host State,
through an entity organized under the laws of the host
State. This clause is a necessary exception to the
general rule that ICSID will not have jurisdiction over the
disputes between a Contracting State and its own
18 5
nationals. If no exceptions were made for foreign-
controlled but locally-incorporated entities, a significant
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 2 5 (2) (b)
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and important sector of foreign investments would be outside
the jurisdiction of the Convention,
In certain cases, an investor or investors controlling
a local company will have the nationality of only one
Contracting State. This makes the test on nationality
simple. All that needs to be done is to identify the
Contracting State of which the investors are nationals.
In some cases, the situation is more complex, such as when
the local entity is controlled not by a single investor, or
investors of the same nationality, but by a group of
companies of different nationalities with the goal to
combine the financial resources for the joint ventures.
This situation requires additional precision from the
parties in their investment agreement.
The exception to the nationality requirement and
multiple participants in the joint venture were the subject
of extensive attention in the first "World Bank" arbitration
18 9m Holiday Inns. v. Morocco. This arbitration arose out
of a 1966 joint venture agreement between the Government of
''' Id.
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Morocco, on the one side, and two U.S. companies. Occidental
Petroleum Corporation and Holiday Inns, on the other, for
the construction of four hotels in Morocco. The problem was
that these two companies were not signatories of the joint
venture. Instead, the signatories were the Swiss subsidiary
of Holiday Inns and the subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum
Corporation. Neither of signatories was in existence on the
date of execution of the agreement.
The Government of Morocco objected to the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction over the locally-incorporated
H.I.S.A. companies on the ground that Morocco had never
agreed in writing to treat these companies as nationals of
another Contracting State within the Article 25(2) (b)
exception.'^ The tribunal stated that an exception should
normally be explicitly included in an agreement. However,
the tribunal specified that: " [A] n implied agreement would
only be acceptable in the event that the specific
circumstances would exclude any other interpretation of the
intention of the parties, which is not the case here."
The tribunal concluded that the Government of Morocco itself
had requested the foreign companies to form the companies in
^^° Id. at 123, 138-139
^^^ Id. at 123, 141.
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question and at all times treated the H.I.S.A. companies as
alter egos of their foreign parent companies.'''^
The tribunal's decision appears to be the confirmation
of the notion that exception under the Article 25(2) (b)
constitutes a departure from the traditional rules of
international law preventing nationals from suing their own
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state internationally. The tribunal obviously considered
that the creation of locally-incorporated entities is
frequently a necessary to foreign investments and that the
Article 25(2) (b) exception was designed to permit the
jurisdiction of ICSID over disputes arising in connection
with the activities of these entities.
2. The Identity of the Contracting State.
Article 25(1) of the Convention requires that one party
be a Contracting State or a "constituent subdivision or
agency" of a Contracting State. The issue of a Contracting
State's membership date was also discussed in Holiday Inns
V. Morocco. The Government of Morocco objected to ICSID'
s
^^^ Id. at 123,140-141.
Rand, supra note 125, at 33, 47.
''' Id.
Lalive, supra note 189, at 123.
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jurisdiction over Swiss subsidiary of Holiday Inns that had
signed the investment agreement containing recourse to ICSID
19 6
arbitration and conciliation. One of the reasons for the
objection was that Switzerland was not yet a Contracting
State at the time of the execution of the agreement. The
tribunal disposed of Morocco's objection by ruling that
parties can reserve the effectiveness of their arbitration
clause to the occurrence of certain events, including the
adherence of relevant states to the Convention. Although
the tribunal's decision concerned the foreign investor
rather than the host country, it provided the principle that
the status of Contracting State is determined by the date of
submission of the dispute to ICSID, rather than the date
when the parties concluded an investment agreement.
Under Article 25(1) of the Convention, each Contracting
State has a right to designate to ICSID its particular
public entities of which it considers eligible to be parties
to arbitration or conciliation proceedings. The
designation only, however, is not enough for a subdivision
''' Id.
^^^ Lalive, supra note 189, at 123, 142
^^^ Id. at 123, 144.
''' Id.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 22.
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or agency to consent and accordingly to be a party to the
ICSID proceedings. Article 25(3) provides that such a
consent requires the approval of a Contracting State that
designates its public entities, unless such a Contracting
State waives its right of approval
.
It will normally not be difficult to define the status
of a subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, since the
Convention requires that they should be designated to ICSID.
Moreover their consent is subject to a Contracting State's
approval unless that State notifies ICSID that approval is
not required. Such notification will presumably be accepted
as proof of the status as a subdivision or agency.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(3)
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION
Today, international investment is universally
recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the
development of developing countries' economy. International
investment activities have become one of the essential
features fostering cooperation between developed and
developing countries and its promotion a matter of strong
concern for both parties.
In this regard, ICSID is to some extent a balanced
international forum that promotes adequate protection for
foreign investors as well as regulates their conduct and
their responsibilities to the public interest.
The beneficial features of the Convention such as the
international dispute settlement mechanism, binding on both
parties award, and perhaps most important, impartial
character of institutional arbitration and conciliation,
have made the Convention and the Centre acceptable to a
growing number of countries. The use of ICSID clauses has
63
64
become widespread in BITs, national investment laws and
codes, and individual agreements.
However, ICSID has its constraints too. The annulment
issue poses a serious threat to ICSID' s viability because of
the expansive readings of Article 52 given by several ad hoc
committees. Solving this problem will require creative
efforts by ICSID administration and understanding by the
Contracting States of the necessity to exclude some of their
annulment rights.
ICSID fills a niche not stressed by other international
dispute resolution institutions by requiring a consent to be
given by the parties to submit a dispute to ICSID and by
limiting the class of participants and the subject matter
jurisdiction.
With regard to consent, arbitration decisions in Alcoa
V. Jamaica and Amco-Asia v. Indonesia stressed out that
counsels to the parties should clearly spell out the
provisions of mutual consent of the parties. This will
greatly help to avoid the future disputes between the
parties.
The Convention left a definition of the term investment
open to the discretion of the parties. By so doing, ICSID
65
expands its jurisdiction over new forms of investment
disputes. However, the notification of a party that it will
not submit a class or classes of the disputes to the ICSID
jurisdiction, impedes this open construction. This
provision is an insurance to both parties of investment
agreement and therefore will likely remain.
The jurisdiction of ICSID applies to investment
disputes when the Contracting State, constituent
subdivision, or constituent agency is an actual partner in
an investment project. The jurisdiction does not apply when
the state's involvement is limited to the exercise of
regulatory controls or other power as an approval authority.
With regard to the investor's legal status, the most
controversial point is an exception that the juridical
person incorporated in the host Contracting State might be
considered as the national of another Contracting State.
ICSID considers this provision as a necessary exception to
the general rule that ICSID will not have jurisdiction over
the disputes involving the Contracting State and its own
nationals
.
The jurisprudence developed by ICSID with respect to
its own jurisdiction had thus far evolved exclusively in
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cases where the investment agreement contained an ICSID
arbitration clause. However, the parties reasonable
reliance on a promise of ICSID arbitration stated in
bilateral investment treaty or national legislation, should
not be frustrated. By affirming the power of ICSID to
resolve the disputes when parties legitimately relied on
ICSID arbitration, the Centre will realize its goal as a
forum promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence between
investors and host countries and thus encourage
international investment to the mutual benefit of investors
and host states.
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